I. INTRODUCTION
The number and value of bonds issued by emerging-market borrowers grew enormously in the course of the 1990s (Table 1) . They were a major source of capital for developing countries and had significant implications for the operation of international capital markets. The value of the bonds issued by developing countries rose from negligible levels in the 1980s (less than $3.5 billion in 1989) to $24 billion in 1992, more than $50 billion per annum in 1993-95, an unprecedented $102 billion in 1996, and even higher levels in 1997.
1 Equity issues, while the subject of much attention, never reached comparable heights.
The market's ability to discriminate among borrowers and to price risk accordingly has been controversial, to say the least. Some observers emphasize that the information relevant for forecasting returns is costly to acquire and process. Investors, in this view, price bonds on the basis of incomplete knowledge of countriesÕ economic and financial circumstances, a practice conducive to herding and market volatility. 2 Others insist that investors have powerful incentives to be informed and discriminating. As evidence they cite the differentials that exist between yields on bonds issued by countries with different credit ratings and economic characteristics.
Proponents of both views have advanced their preferred explanation for the decline in emerging-market spreads that took place between 1995 and early 1997. The secondary-market spread between developing-country sovereign bonds and high-yield U.S. corporate issues fell from 1752 basis points in March 1995 to 537 basis points in December 1996. 3 (The declining spreads of stripped Brady bonds over U.S. treasury rates is shown in Figure 1 .) Advocates of the Òefficiently-functioning marketsÓ view explain this trend by pointing to improving macroeconomic and financial fundamentals in developing countries, which rededicated themselves to economic liberalization and structural reform and, following the Mexican crisis, redoubled their efforts to put their fiscal, monetary, and financial affairs in order. Better policies, Emerging Market Bond Spreads in this view, implied reductions in the risk of investing in emerging-market debt and justified the decline in spreads. Others, more skeptical of market efficiency, question whether fundamentals improved sufficiently to justify the striking decline in spreads and suggest that investors in their exuberance may have been snapping up emerging-market debt in disregard of historical relationships between fundamentals and yields. 4 The weight that should be attached to these interpretations is critical for how we regard the post-1995 surge of portfolio capital flows to emerging markets and its equally sudden halt (along with a sharp rise in spreads) toward the end of 1997. If increased lending and spread compression in the second-half of 1996 and early 1997 reflected improved fundamentals in the borrowing countries, then there is no reason to think that these favorable trends cannot be sustained. Governments being richly rewarded for putting national policies on a firmer footing, there are few grounds for worrying that the trend toward policy reform will be reversed or that the demand for emerging-market debt will dry up. But if the surge of capital flows and decline in spreads reflected mainly the effects of liberal credit conditions in the major money centers, then there was reason to worry about the effects of the eventual tightening of financial-market conditions in the advanced industrial countries. Even more troubling would be evidence that the increased capital flows and reduced spreads of the period centered on 1996 reflected an arbitrary shift in pricing behavior, in which case there was no reason to rule out an equally sudden shift back and a corresponding curtailment of flows.
In this paper we analyze data on about 1300 developing-country bonds launched in the years 1991-1997, a period which spans the recent episode of heavy reliance on bonded debt. In contrast to previous studies, we pay special attention to problems of sample selection. We analyze both the issue decision of debtors and underwriters and the pricing decision of investors.
We minimize selectivity bias by treating the two decisions jointly.
Overall, the results confirm that higher credit quality leads to a higher probability of issue and to lower spreads. This supports the presumption that the market discriminates among issuers according to risk. But the same explanatory variables have different effects in the principal debtissuing regions (Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe). And when it comes to changes in spreads over time, we find that these are explained mainly by shifts in market sentiment rather than by shifts in fundamentals. An obvious break-point is the fourth quarter of 1994, when the Mexican crisis erupted and spreads moved sharply higher, before falling subsequently to lower levels than before. Comparing 1991-I to 1994-III with 1995-I to 1995-IV (the pre-and postMexican crisis-subperiods), we find that changes in spreads were dominated by sharp adverse shifts in market sentiment, more than by changes in fundamentals. The same is true of the subsequent compression, which this time reflected favorable shifts in market sentiment.
Section 2 of the paper begins by reviewing the literature. Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 issues of specification and estimation. Section 5 reports the basic results for both the issue decision and pricing behavior. Section 6 attempts to decompose the contributions of fundamentals and market sentiment to pricing behavior over time. Shifts in pricing behavior are also examined by comparing predicted and actual spreads both within the estimated sample and out of the sample. Section 7 draws out the implications of the analysis for how to think about emerging-market debt.
II. THE LITERATURE
Despite the explosive growth of emerging-market debt, there have been few systematic studies of the issue and pricing of developing-country bonds. This is in contrast to the secondary market for bank loans, on which there exist a significant number of studies (reflecting the dominance of banking lending in the period 1974-82). 5 But there is reason to think that the determinants of risk and therefore pricing behavior differ between bank loans and bonds.
Models of delegated monitoring suggest that banks may have a comparative advantage in assembling and processing information about their clients and that this reputational asset may be incorporated into the secondary market prices of their claims. Pecking-order theories of finance suggest that claims with different degrees of seniority have different levels of risk and that their prices should bear a different relationship to fundamentals. Bonds typically have senior status, while the legal status of bank loans is more variable. Thus, the conclusions from studies of the market in bank loans may not carry over to the market in bonded debt.
The few extant studies of the market for developing-country bonds are subject to other limitations. For instance, Cantor and Packer (1996) analyze the determinants of spreads on sovereign bonds for 49 countries in 1995, relating spreads to per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, the fiscal balance, the external balance, and external debt, to indicators of economic development and default history, and to the average of MoodyÕs and Standard and PoorÕs country credit ratings. Limitations of this study include the fact that it considers developed as well as developing countries, that it analyzes only sovereign bonds and not also private issues, and that none of the macroeconomic variables is statistically significant when credit ratings are included. Cline (1995) limits his consideration to developing countries and includes corporate as well as government borrowers. However, he studies only highly-indebted countries, whose representativeness may be questioned, and he considers only four economic determinants of -5-Emerging Market Bond Spreads interest rate spreads: inflation, per capita income, export growth and GDP growth (along with dummy variables for private issues and participation in Brady Plan debt reduction schemes).
Because his sample ends with the second quarter of 1993, he has only 92 bond issues, and some of his estimates are for just 68 bonds. Of his four economic variables only export growth and GDP growth differ significantly from zero at standard confidence levels. A follow-up study (Cline and Barnes, 1997 ) uses more recent data and a somewhat longer list of explanatory variables but is otherwise subject to many of the same limitations. In addition, it uses data for selected Western European borrowers as well as emerging markets, raising questions about the homogeneity of the sample. Eichengreen and Portes (1989) analyze a larger sample of 375 international bonds issued in the 1920s, the last time bond markets were a leading vehicle for international lending. But the fact that their sample includes both developing and advanced industrial countries and that the information and regulatory structure of the market has changed over time limits the relevance of this study for present purposes. Edwards (1986) analyzes bond spreads in 1976-80, but since there did not then exist an active market in developing-country debt he has data for only 13 countries and 167 bonds. And it is not clear that we should expect pricing performance to remain the same over time. 6 New investors have entered the market since the period Edwards analyzes: while banks held fully 97 per cent of all emerging market debt at the end of the 1980s, their share had fallen to less than two thirds by the mid-1990s (Bernstein and Penicook 1996) .
New issuers entered as well. Finally, a study by Kamin and van Kleist (1997) Surprising, they find that the coefficient on industrial country interest rates tends to be significantly negative or insignificantly different from zero, but never positive.
The fact that country participation in the bond market has risen over time suggests that ordinary-least-squares estimates of the relationship between spreads and country characteristics will suffer from selectivity bias. The same changes in economic and financial conditions that affect the price of issues can also affect the decision to enter the market. Bond traders often remark that a rise in U.S. Treasury rates raises spreads on developing-country bonds less than proportionately, for example, because high-risk borrowers are discouraged from coming to the market. Focusing exclusively on the determinants of the pricing decision to the neglect of the impact of those same factors on the decision to enter the market may therefore be a source of selectivity bias. In the next sections we employ a data set and methodology designed to ameliorate these problems.
III. DATA AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
The bonds we study are fixed income securities with a specified maturity, face value and coupon.
8 While issued by emerging market borrowers, they are placed on international markets and are denominated in developed country currencies (dominantly in U.S. dollars). Although the bulk of this market consists of bonds placed in the Euromarkets (mainly the Eurodollar market), over our sample period a growing number of countries floated bonds on the U.S. public market for foreign issuers (the Yankee market) and the U.S. private placement market (under provisions of Rule 144a); there was also some growth in issues denominated in deutche marks and yen. The Figure 2 shows that launch spreads move differently over time than spreads on secondary markets. While there is some tendency for primary spreads to follow secondary spreads by a lag of three or four quarters, the two series frequently diverge. In poor market conditions, when secondary spreads rise, primary spreads do not rise proportionately;
indeed, sometimes they fall. This reflects the tendency for the number of issues to fall and for only the most creditworthy borrowers to remain in the market. In other words, factors which increase the risks of investing in emerging market debt, while raising secondary market spreads, may have the opposite effect on launch spreads insofar as riskier borrowers are rationed out of -8-Emerging Market Bond Spreads the market, leaving only low-risk, low-spread borrowers to launch new issues. This makes it important to control for the likelihood of new issues by different classes of borrowers.
Our source provides data for 1697 bonds over the period 1991-97 ( Table 2 ). The number of bonds issued grew rapidly from 84 to 332 in 1993 before falling to just over 200 in 1994 and 1995 (the Mexican crisis contributing to poor market conditions in 1995). Bond issuance rose sharply in 1996 and was set to record a banner year in 1997 before the Asian crisis hit. In our analysis we were able to use just over 1300 bonds. No spreads were publicly available for 339 bonds. Also, for some bond issues ancillary information on country conditions was incomplete.
Our results are based on data for 1991 through 1996, for which we have 1033 usable bonds. We use 277 bonds issued in 1997 for out-of-sample forecasting.
Latin America accounts for about 60 percent of the bonds issued (1000 of the 1697). The main Latin issuers were Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. East Asia is a distant with 416 bonds (Korea being a leading issuer in that region). East Europe had 180 bonds in this period, with 1997 an especially active year for the region.
Latin America has also had the highest spreads. Annual average spreads were more than 350 basis points in all the years from 1991 to 1996 and fell for the first time below that level to 307 basis points in 1997. In contrast, East Asian spreads were always less than 200 basis points even in 1997 when they rose to their highest level. That said, there is considerable variation within East Asia; the standard deviation of spreads relative to the mean is typically higher for East Asia than Latin America. East European spreads have consistently been in between Latin America and East Asia. Table 3 summarizes sample characteristics by type of issuer. Three categories are distinguished: sovereign, other public, and private. The majority of the issues are by private borrowers, although public entities in East Asia have a relatively high propensity to issue bonds.
-9-Emerging Market Bond Spreads Sovereign issues dominate in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Sovereign issues do not necessarily carry higher spreads than the other public issues, which partly reflects variations in country composition, although the regression analysis to follow suggests other factors may also be at work. We would expect private issues to carry higher spreads, reflecting the benchmark status of public issues and private bondsÕ greater perceived riskiness. 9 The averages for all regions except South Asia confirm this presumption, as does the regression analysis.
Explanatory Variables
We used a variety of macroeconomic indicators to analyze the determinants of the issue decision and the spread. As a proxy for the risk-free rate, we used the yield on ten-year U.S.
treasury bonds (at time of issue). Several country characteristics were used to proxy for credit quality (for details, see the data appendix). Data was principally obtained from the World
BankÕs World Debt Tables and Global Development Finance and the IMFÕs International
Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook on the ratio of total external debt to GNP, the ratio of debt service to exports, a dummy variable for whether a country concluded a debt restructuring agreement with either private or official creditors in the previous year, the ratio of international reserves to GNP, the growth rate of GDP (at constant 1990 prices, denominated in domestic currency), and the budget deficit as a share of GDP.
Sovereign credit ratings were gathered from Institutional Investor. Published each March and September, these ratings are based on a survey of international bankers, who assign a numerical value ranging from 0 to 100 (with 100 indicating zero probability of default). For each observation we used the most recent credit rating prior to the bondÕs date of issue. But rather than including the raw country credit rating, we employ the residual from a first-stage regression of the credit rating on country and issuer characteristics. We utilize only the orthogonalized component because the credit rating is correlated with other issuer characteristics that are included separately as explanatory variables (see e.g. Cantor and Packer (1996) and Haque (1996) et al.) . 10 Because a preliminary look at the data suggested different behavior on the part of issuers in Latin America and the Caribbean, we considered Latin American and East
Asian issues separately as well as together.
IV. SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
A standard model of spreads is a linear relationship of the form:
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the spread, X is a vector of issue and issuer characteristics, and u 1 is a random error. X is comprised of bond characteristics (the maturity of the bond, principal amount, and whether it was privately placed); global economic conditions proxied by the ten-year rate on U.S. treasuries; country characteristics like the sovereign credit rating residual, the ratio of debt to GDP, the ratio of debt service to exports, a dummy variable if the country underwent a debt restructuring in the previous year, and the GDP growth rate; and issuer characteristics including the region of the borrower, whether the borrower is sovereign, other public, or private, and the currency in which the bond was issued.
The conditions under which this linear equation provides an unbiased estimate of the relationship of issuer characteristics to spreads may not be met, for not all potential issuers will be in the sample at all points in time. The spread and its relationship to issue and issuer characteristics will be observed only when positive decisions to borrow and lend are made. We assume that spreads are observed when a latent variable β crosses a threshold β' defined by:
where X' is the vector of variables that determines the desire of borrowers to borrow and willingness of lenders to lend (which we refer to as determinants of bond supply and demand, respectively Heckman (1979) . The model can be identified by the nonlinearity of the fitted probabilities in the selection equation and by the inclusion of elements in X' that are not also in X.
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Estimating the probit requires information on those who did not issue bonds. To address this problem we used the following approach. For each country we allowed for three types of issuers: sovereign, public, and private. For each quarter and country where one of these issuer types did not come to the market, we recorded a zero. Table 4 highlights the characteristics of issuers (is = 1) relative to Ònon-issuersÓ (is = 0). It suggests, plausibly, that issues are more likely when U.S. interest rates are low, when the borrower is of better quality credit (with higher credit rating residuals and lower debt levels), and when reserves are low and budget deficits are larger (creating a public-sector demand for foreign funds).
We estimate equations (1) and (2) jointly using maximum likelihood. Implemented with the full sample, the maximum-likelihood estimates converge nicely. When performing the sensitivity tests using smaller samples, the full maximum-likelihood estimates do not always converge; in this case we perform the conventional two-step procedure, first estimating a maximum-likelihood probit model and then a regression using the estimated Inverse Mills Ratio (with full-information standard errors). Where estimates are obtained using both procedures, we find little difference in the results.
V. RESULTS
The coefficients for the probit in Table 5 are normalized to the partial derivative of the probability distribution function with respect to a small change in the independent variable evaluated at average values of the independent variables to facilitate interpretation of the -13-Emerging Market Bond Spreads coefficients. We report separate equations for the full data set and for the Latin American and Carribean (henceforth referred to as Latin America), East Asian and East European subsamples.
When the U.S. treasury rate is high, the volume of new issues declines significantly. This finding is consistent with a Òsearch for yieldÓ view of the marketthe idea that when U.S. interest rates fall there is a greater appetite for higher yielding emerging market bonds. This appears to be uniformly the case, although the strength of the relationship varies across the regions. A sharp decline in issues following a rise in U.S. treasury rates is most evident for East Asia, suggesting the possibility that the East Asian issuers also hold back the supply of bonds when U.S. interest rates rise and their borrowing costs go up.
12 The higher the credit rating residual, the greater the probability of issuance in all regions except East Asia, where the effect is insignificant. Higher debt levels reduce the probability of issue especially in Latin America. For
East Asia, higher debt service is associated with lower probability of issue. On the supply side, low reserves, higher deficits, and for Latin America and Eastern Europe debt service levels tend to increase bond issuance. Table 6 presents ordinary least square estimates of the spread equation and Table 7 the full model with the selectivity correction. The coefficients once again reveal differences in pricing across regions. For Latin America the coefficient on the issue amount indicates plausibly that larger issues command smaller spreads (consistent with the existence of economies of marketing and distribution and the greater liquidity of larger issues on the secondary market).
Latin American private placements enter the spreads equation with a positive sign, consistent with the fact that these bonds are issued in markets with less stringent disclosure requirements.
Disclosure requirements for private placements are less stringent because trading in those bonds is restricted to Òqualified investors,Ó that is, investors capable of managing the associated risk.
-14-Emerging Market Bond Spreads Also, the bonds for this reason are less liquid. Because the private placement market is narrower and because information on issuer characteristics may be somewhat less complete, the presumption is that purchasers of bonds placed in that market will demand a higher spread. Latin American issues typically having been relatively short term, there is little evidence of a welldefined yield curve until 1996. The picture is different for East Asian issuers, who had by then placed several long-term issues for which they paid higher spreads. There is a large negative coefficient in the spreads equation on the dummy variable for Israel, reflecting the fact that its issues are guaranteed by the U.S. government. Supranational bonds (guaranteed by entities beyond the countriesÕ borders) also have lower spreads.
Recent studies have found, somewhat surprisingly, a negative influence of the U.S. interest rate on emerging market spreads (see, for example, Kamin and van Kleist 1997) . The OLS results presented in Table 6 are consistent with this finding. Among the possible interpretations of the negative sign is the change in composition of bonds issued when interest rates vary. Since higher interest rates are seen to reduce bond issuance (as in the probit above), it possible that the bonds that do come to the market have some unobserved credit features that makes them attractive and hence reduces observed spreads. If this interpretation is correct, then the negative sign should be significantly attenuated when we correct for the selection bias.
Indeed, comparing the coefficients in Tables 6 and 7 , we find for Latin America that the negative coefficient on the U.S. treasury rate turns positive and significant at the 10-percent level. This is consistent with the idea that selection bias plays a role in driving the observed result.
For East Asia, in contrast, the negative coefficient on the U.S. interest rate persists even after correcting for selectivity. To interpret this finding, it is useful to consider the probit and the spreads equation together, for this leads to an intuitive interpretation in terms of supply and demand. 13 For Latin America, a higher interest rate reduces the probability of an issue and raises -15-Emerging Market Bond Spreads spreads (after correction for the selection bias). The implication is that when interest rates rise, the demand for Latin American bonds falls and their price therefore declines (equivalently, the spread rises). For East Asia, in contrast, a rise in U.S. interest rates appears to shift the supply curve inwards, raising the price and reducing the spread.
For other variables that appear in both the issue and spreads equations, it is once again useful to ask whether they work in the same or opposing directions. In the regressions using the full sample of bonds, a larger credit rating residual (a better credit rating, other things equal) increases the probability of an issue and reduces the spread, as if countries with inferior credit ratings find it both more difficult and costly to borrow. Similarly, and especially in Latin America, a higher debt/GNP ratio both reduces the probability of an issue and increases the spread. In Latin America, debt rescheduling has a weak positive effect on the probability of an issue (i.e., those rescheduling debt are apt to come to the capital market quickly) while at the same time raising the spread that successful issuers are forced to pay. The dummy variable for Latin America behaves similarly: other things equal, Latin American borrowers issue more bonds but pay higher spreads. Finally, although the magnitude and the significance of rhothe correlation coefficient of the errors in the two equationsvaries by time period and sample, it is generally negative. The implication is that unobserved factors that cause an issue to come to the market also reduce the spread and should be interpreted as unobserved determinants of demand.
In contrast, variables whose coefficients work in offsetting directions influence mainly the supply of bonds. For example, while countries that have recently rescheduled tend to have accumulated an unsatisfied appetite for borrowing and therefore supply additional new issues, the corresponding outward shift in the supply reduces the price of their bonds, increasing the spread. Similarly, the regional dummies suggest that Latin American countries have continentspecific characteristics, not otherwise quantified, that cause them to supply an unusually high Emerging Market Bond Spreads volume of bonds; this works, other things equal, to drive down the prices of their issues and increase the spreads they are charged.
The supply and demand effects vary noticeably by region. Note, for example, that the coefficients for issues denominated in Yen and Deutche Marks have significant negative signs for East Asia but not so elsewhere. Thus, for East Asia, it appears access to the Yen-denominated markets (and to the Deutche Mark markets) has proved an easy source of funds. With that source of funds available, the East Asian issuers are better able to time their bond issues. Another example of differential effects between East Asia and Latin America is the sign on Òrho,Ó the correlation between the error terms in the spread and probit equations. For Latin America this term behaves much like the credit rating residuala low probability of issue is associated with a higher-than-predicted spread. For East Asia, in contrast, ÒrhoÓ is positive. An interpretation is that Asian bonds with a low probability of issue that come to the market anyway are not penalized with higher spreads. In fact, they are able to obtain lower than predicted spreads, perhaps reflecting the desire of investors, for reasons of diversification, to acquire East Asian bonds that are not in plentiful supply.
-17-Emerging Market Bond Spreads
VI. CHANGES IN SPREADS OVER TIME
A central question in the literature on capital flows to emerging markets is whether changes in spreads are explicable by changes in fundamentals or whether there have been changes in pricing behavior over time. If a better credit rating, lower debt or debt service ratios, and fewer debt restructurings can explain the reductions in spreads that occurred between 1995 and 1997, then there may be reason to be relatively sanguine about the marketÕs pricing behavior and, for that matter, about the sustainability of capital flows. If, on the other hand, recent capital inflows were encouraged by a not otherwise explicable shift in pricing in favor of developing country debt, then there is no a priori reason to rule out a sudden and equally dramatic shift back and a corresponding curtailment of flows.
The contribution of fundamentals and sentiment
The change in spreads between two periods, denoted S 1 -S 2 , can be expressed as follows:
Adding and subtracting β 1 X 2 and rearranging, one obtains the familiar Oxaca decomposition:
The first term on the right-hand side of (4) is the contribution to the change in spreads of the change in their economic determinants (X 1 -X 2 ); this can be thought of as the contribution of the change in fundamentals. The second term is the contribution of the change in coefficients (β 1 -β 2 ). This can be thought of as the contribution of changes in market sentiment--in the way the markets regard the credit worthiness of countries with given characteristics. To aid interpretation, we further break these effects into subcategories. Among changes in sentiment, we distinguish the impact on spreads of changes in the constant term (C 1 -C 2 ), which can be thought of as blanket changes in sentiment as emerging market bonds come into or fall out of favor, from the impact of changes in the coefficients on the independent variables [X 2 (β 1 -β 2 )], which can be thought of as changes in sentiment toward countries with given macroeconomic characteristics (as, for example, the issues of relatively risky borrowers come to be regarded as more attractive).
Similarly, we distinguish changes in the average Inverse Mills Ratio (which can be thought of as a measure of sample selectivity) versus changes in the average value of the other variables.
Finally, we distinguish changes in the effect of a given level of the Inverse Mills Ratio (which can be thought of as the impact on spreads of having in the sample an issue that our selection equation predicts should not be included) from changes in the effect of other regressors.
Intuitively, a rising coefficient on the Inverse Mills Ratio suggests that the market is growing more discriminating.
The decompositions are computed for two period, before and after the Mexican crisis, and before and during the 1996-97 period of spread compression (see Table 8 ). Note that when the spread in the first period is larger than in the second (spreads are falling), a positive change in log spread is recorded. Launch spreads declined following the Mexican crisis; that decline was especially sharp in 1995, when only high quality issues were brought to the market. (Recall that secondary spreads skyrocketed in 1995. That shift in sentiment against developing countries is reflected in issue behavior, as discussed below.)
Consider first the period preceding the Mexican crisis (1991:1-1994: 3) compared to the period immediately following (1995:1-1995:4) . While secondary market spreads rose sharply in 1995, launch spreads actually fell, as can be seen from the first panel of Table 8 (again, according to our convention, a positive change in spread represents a decline in spreads from the first to the second period). This decline in spreads reflected five broad factors. First, market sentiment moved strongly against emerging markets: the constant term in the spread equation increased greatly and, all else equal, would have increased primary spreads considerably (in parallel with trends in the secondary markets). Second, this poorer market sentiment was offset by a change in the coefficient on U.S. treasury rates. For given U.S. treasury rates, in other words, the market was willing to charge lower spreads for the issues that were brought to the market. Third, the fundamentals of issuers coming to the market during the post crisis period were better than those of issuers in the market prior to the crisis. Fourth, the market seems to have taken a more benign view of fundamentals immediately following the crisis. An exception to that was a more negative view of high debt service. Finally, there were compositional shifts in the issues that came to the market that lowered average spreads: proportionately fewer Latin
American issues and private issues and a greater share of Yen-denominated and Deutche Markdenominated issues reduced the average level of spreads observed.
Secondary market spreads declined in 1996 and in the first half of 1997, a trend that was viewed by some as Òirrational exhuberance.Ó But though secondary market spreads were falling, primary spreads show a small increase. But once again, this increase is composed of offsetting factors (see the bottom panel of Table 8 ). Overall market sentiment (as summarized by the constant) improves. Again, as new, less creditworthy issuers came to the market, this shift in market sentiment was moderated by two offsetting factors: the reduced sensitivity of spreads to changes in U.S. interest rates, and a higher premium on the poorer risks entering the market.
Was the market irrationally exuberant in 1996 and 1997?
The sharp decline in spreads in the second half of 1996 and continuing through at least the first half of 1997 led some observers to ask whether the market was irrationally exuberant.
The decline in spreads was exceptionally rapid, and an unusual number of new issuers entered the market. Our estimates allow us to compare these outcomes with predictions.
We first estimated the equation for Latin America and East Asia for up to 1995 and used the estimates to generate within-sample forecasts for 1995 and out-of-sample forecasts for 1996.
The difference between predicted and actual spreads (in basis points) is presented in Table 9 .
When the observed spread is less than predicted (an entry with a positive sign in Table 9 ), we infer that the market is growing increasingly exuberant. Actual spreads were above predicted spreads and were especially high in late 1995 and early 1996. This is consistent with the earlier observation that primary launch spreads lag the changes in secondary market prices. Following a sharp decline in new issues as secondary spreads rose, primary issues started coming back to the market at higher spreads. In the second half of 1996, the divergence between actual and predicted spreads narrowed foreshadowing the Òirrational exuberanceÓ of 1997.
We next repeated the estimates up to 1996 (as in Table 7 ) and generated in-sample predictions for 1996 and out-of-sample predictions for 1997. The aggressive fall in spreads is evident for Latin America. Actual spreads fall below predicted with the gap increasing up to the third quarter of 1997. In the final quarter of 1997, the gap falls. With the East Asian crisis of the summer of 1997 spreading to Latin America, spreads rose bringing the closer to the predicted spreads. For East Asia, we see clearly the effect of the crisis, with actual spreads rise rapidly above predicted spreads in the second half of 1997.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
We have st udi ed t he deter mi nant s of launch spr eads on em er gi ng market debt using a f ramewor k that account s for t he joint det er m inat i on of the i ssue and pri cing decisions and contr ols f or sel ect ivi ty. F act or s whi ch incr ease the probabil it y of obser vi ng an issue and r aise the spr ead we i nt er pr et in term s of the suppl y of bonds, whi le those whi ch incr ease the probabil it y of an issue whl e reducing t he spread we i nt erpret i n ter ms of dem and. The r esul t s confi rm t he im por tance of bot h bl ades of the sci ssors. But the r esul t s for L at in Am er i ca and East Asia ar e di f ferent , especial ly t oward t he beginni ng of t he 1990s. F or exam ple, there i s evi dence t hat t he suppl y of bonds by L at i n Am er i can issuers is l ess r esponsi ve to changi ng market condi ti ons. T her e is some sign that the ext ent of thi s regional dif fer enti ati on has nar rowed as the m ar ket has gr own deeper .
Other si gns of a mat ur ing m ar ket i ncl ude the appear ance of a well -def ined yi el d cur ve f or Lati n Ameri ca, evi dence t hat borr ower s are expl oi t ing scale econom i es when i ssuing bonds.
Our m ost str i ki ng f i nding i s that changes i n m ar ket sent im ent not obvi ously r el ated to f undamentals have m oved the m ar ket by l ar ge am ounts over shor t peri ods. Changes i n obser vable i ssuer characteri st i cs and in t he responsiveness of spr eads and i ssues t o t hose char act er ist ics do not provi de an adequate expl anati on for changes over ti me i n t he value of new bond issues and l aunch spr eads. In im port ant peri ods, such as t he wake of t he Mexi can and Asian cri ses, bl anket shif ts in senti ment pl ay the dom inant r ol e.
T he obvi ous impli cat ion for pol i cy i s t hat gover nment s shoul d exerci se caut ion when contempl at ing an economi c pol icy str ategy t hat r eli es on cont inuous infl ows of for ei gn capi t al i nt er mediated by the i nt ernat ional bond m ar ket . Large quant i ti es of f or eign cr edi t may be avail abl e when senti ment shif t s in thei r favor , but i t can al so shif t against them for reasons beyond thei r contr ol , m aki ng i t impossible t o f inance lar ge curr ent account defi cit s and f or cing a dif fi cul t adj ustm ent . Ther e is an ar gument for i nsur i ng agai nst the capr iciousness of the bond m ar ket by -22-Emerging Market Bond Spreads diver si f yi ng sour ces of int er nat ional bor rowing to incl ude f oreign dir ect i nvest ment , equit y i nvestm ent , and syndicat ed bank loans. And it woul d be pr udent t o insur e against the sudden evaporat ion of forei gn f i nancing and the sudden appearance of a pai nful adj ustm ent burden by t aking steps to l im i t the size of the cur rent account defi ci t .
T he f ir st round of empir ical wor k for thi s paper was done in t he fi r st hal f of 1997, a peri od of large-scale bond i ssues by emer gi ng m arket borr owers and dr am ati c spr ead com pr ession. T her e wer e but a f ew voices in the wi l derness war ning that thi s favor able st at e of af f ai rs coul d com e to a sudden end at any t i me. In a sense, this was the centr al pr edi ct ion of our empi ri cal wor k. I t cam e t rue in the final quar ter of that year. (b) A bondÕs spread is estimated by first calculating that bondÕs yield to maturity using the market price at the time of issue and then subtracting the yield on a ÒrisklessÓ sovereign security of comparable maturity in the currency of issue. if the bond was Òprivately placedÓ and zero otherwise; (e) currency of issue; and (f) whether the issuer was a sovereign, a public agency, or a private party. 2 Calvo and Mendoza (1995) suggest that the incentive to gather costly information is a declining function of opportunities for portfolio diversification, so the marketÕs growth may reduce the information possessed by the individual investor about a particular country. (This result depends on the assumption that the cost of acquiring information about a country is independent of the size of the investment or that it at least involves significant fixed costs.) News can then disproportionately impact the allocation of funds across countries and the prices of particular bonds (assuming that portfolio diversification facilitates reallocation). Under these circumstances, one can imagine how investors might fail to raise the risk premium on a particular bond issue to reflect a gradual deterioration in economic conditions, how news about this trend could lead to a jump in prices, and how information about conditions in one country could lead investors to revise their expectations about the prospects of others with superficially similar characteristics. Chari and Kehoe (1997) argue that Òhot moneyÓ results from "frictions" in information leading to herd-like behavior of investors in and out of countries on the margin, i.e., countries that are not obviously attractive or definitely "nono's." They contrast their model with that of Calvo and Mendoza where the ability to diversify limits incentives for information acquisition. Chari and Kehoe argue that their model predicts the types of countries that will experience hot money flows whereas Calvo and Mendoza predict only that hot money flows will occur. Herd behavior may also be observed for foreign investment (Kinoshita and Mody 1997) .
Country characteristics
3 Spreads continued to fall through the third week of February 1997, after which they reversed -43-direction and began to fluctuate more widely.
4 One oft-heard justification for this view is that the Mexican rescue removed the need for investors to concern themselves with a potential borrowerÕs credit worthiness, or at least left them with this belief, since the U.S. and IMF-led package allowed them to escape the 1994-5 Mexican crisis scot free. If the same Òchain of guaranteesÓ is likely to again come into play in the event of future debtservicing difficulties, bondholders have little reason to invest the time and effort needed to discriminate among bonds according to risk.
5 See Hajivassiliou (1989) and Huizinga (1989) for examples and surveys of the literature.
6 As emphasized in the introduction to our paper.
7 Potentially accentuating the tradeoff between portfolio diversification and information acquisition emphasized by Calvo and Mendoza (1995) .
8 The share of international bond issues with convertible and floating rates did in fact rise slightly after 1993, but we exclude these from the sample on the grounds that the risks and relationship to fundamentals are different and warrant a separate analysis.
9 This is consistent with the procedures of bond-rating agencies, which are reluctant to grant private borrowers higher credit ratings than sovereigns on the grounds that a sovereign with transfer problems will frequently interrupt the access of private domestic debtors to supplies of foreign exchange; see Levey (n.d.) .
